

UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE INTERNATIONAL EXAMINATIONS International General Certificate of Secondary Education

HISTORY 0470/22

Paper 2 October/November 2011

2 hours

Additional Materials: Answer Booklet/Paper

READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS FIRST

If you have been given an Answer Booklet, follow the instructions on the front cover of the Booklet.

Write your Centre number, candidate number and name on all the work you hand in.

Write in dark blue or black pen.

You may use a soft pencil for any diagrams, graphs or rough working.

Do not use staples, paper clips, highlighters, glue or correction fluid.

This paper has two options.

Choose **one** option, and answer **all** of the questions on that topic.

Option A: 19th Century topic [p2-p6]
Option B: 20th Century topic [p7-p11]

At the end of the examination, fasten all your work securely together.

The number of marks is given in brackets [] at the end of each question or part question.



International Examinations

Option A: 19th Century topic

WAS THE FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR PLANNED BY BISMARCK?

Study the Background Information and the sources carefully, and then answer all the questions.

Background Information

By 1866, following the Austro-Prussian War, the Prussian-dominated North German Federation had been formed. However, Germany was not yet united because the South German states remained outside the new Germany. These states were hostile to Prussia and wanted to keep their independence. Some historians believe that Bismarck used the Hohenzollern candidacy for the Spanish throne to make France go to war with Prussia. King William of Prussia was a member of the Hohenzollern family and for this reason the French would not welcome a Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne. These historians claim that, from the start, Bismarck manipulated events to force France to declare war on Prussia, knowing that this would force the South German states to support their fellow Germans. Other historians believe that Bismarck did not deliberately seek a war with France from the beginning and merely took advantage of France's mistakes. Was the Franco-Prussian War planned by Bismarck?

SOURCE A

The deepest cause of the Franco-Prussian War was Prussia's wish to assert and consolidate her newly won power and France's fear that any further strengthening of Prussia was a threat to her own security. Prussia fought for the right to assert her power. France fought to recover the security she had lost in 1866. Napoleon III further knew that war alone could restore the self-respect of his regime and regain for it the confidence of the nation.

There is no reason to suppose that the aim of Bismarck's support for the Hohenzollern candidacy was, from the beginning, war with France. Bismarck took opportunities, he did not create them. There are several difficulties in the way of arguing that Bismarck was using the Hohenzollern candidacy to bring about war with France from the beginning. First, it was due to an accident that France was given an opportunity to protest to Prussia at all. The Spanish negotiators had intended to face France with a fait accompli when all that France could have done was to protest.

A second difficulty is that it was owing to another accident that the French protest was met in Prussia in such a way as to give France offence. Berlin followed the line ordered by Bismarck, that the candidacy was a matter between the Hohenzollern family and the government in Spain. However, the reaction of the Prussian ambassador in Paris gave the French the impression that they were being lied to by Prussia.

If Bismarck was using the candidacy 'to set a trap for Napoleon' he was considerably aided by accident and was far from being complete master of the situation. However, there are also difficulties in claiming that he aimed simply at the peaceful accession of a Hohenzollern prince. If Bismarck had no need of war, he was equally not afraid of it. If diplomatic humiliation provoked France to seek war, he was ready to accept the challenge. The war gave him the occasion to complete the unification.

From a history book published in 1967.

SOURCE B

Anyone who reads Bismarck's memoirs will receive the impression that in the spring of 1870 Germany, Prussia and Bismarck were in the most peaceful mood, and that they were drawn into a war quite unexpectedly and reluctantly by French insolence and hostility. A family affair of the House of Hohenzollern was turned by Napoleon into a political affair and Prussia was forced to go to war to defend her national honour.

The truth is quite different, nearly the opposite of Bismarck's account. Nobody knew this better than Lothar Bucher, the man to whom Bismarck dictated his memoirs. He knew better than anyone else how completely Bismarck distorted the truth, and in conversation with a friend he called the Hohenzollern candidature a 'trap which Bismarck set for Napoleon', and he added that the King had no idea of Bismarck's plan.

Despite Leopold's initial refusal of the Spanish crown, Bismarck continued to support the idea. In March 1870 he organised a dinner in Berlin in honour of Leopold. The purpose of the dinner was to discuss the candidature. Under Bismarck's leadership all the government ministers and generals supported the candidature. Not a single person spoke a word about whether war with France might result from an accession of a Hohenzollern to the Spanish throne. At the dinner a minister asked Moltke, 'But if Napoleon takes it badly, are we ready?' Moltke nodded in a way which expressed his complete confidence in a Prussian victory. There is little doubt that Bismarck was the driving force behind the candidature.

From a history book published in 1984.

SOURCE C

There is nothing in our attitude to annoy or alarm France. There is nothing to prevent the maintenance of peace for ten or fifteen years, by which time the French will have become accustomed to German unity.

I told our generals this spring, when they tried to argue with me that we must beat the French if we went to war then, 'I will still do all I can to prevent war; for you must remember a war between such near neighbours and old enemies as France and Prussia is only the first of at least six; and supposing we won all six, what should we have succeeded in doing? Why, in ruining France certainly, and most likely ourselves as well. Do you think a starving and bankrupt neighbour is as desirable as a wealthy and well clothed one? France buys largely from us and sells us a great many things we want.'

I strove for peace then, and I will do so now. Only remember, German feelings have to be respected. I cannot answer for the people – not even for the King!

Bismarck speaking in an interview with a British journalist, September 1867.

The interview was published in a British newspaper.

SOURCE D

The French Ambassador visited me on the eighth. The only thing that he wanted to talk about was the question of whether Prussia would give a King of any sort to the Spaniards. I turned this question aside with a joke and told him that of course we had taken soundings recently in the princely house of Hohenzollern to see whether the Prince had any wish to accept the Crown but that both himself and his father said they were for declining it and that his Majesty King William, when he later learnt of it, said that he understood that very well.

A letter from Bismarck to the Prussian Ambassador in Paris, May 1869.

SOURCE E

Acceptance of the Spanish Royal Crown by a Prince of your Majesty's illustrious family would strengthen existing sympathies between two nations. For Germany it is desirable to have on the other side of France a country on whose sympathies* we can rely. If Spain was friendly with us, then France would have fewer soldiers to put in the field against Germany.** We have to look for the preservation of peace not from the goodwill of France but from the impression created by our position of strength. The prosperity of Spain, and Germany's trade with her, would receive powerful encouragement under Hohenzollern rule. In the event of a rejection, the Spaniards would probably turn to Bavaria. Spain would have a ruler who looked to France, maintaining contact with anti-national elements in Germany.

A letter from Bismarck to William I, March 1870. This letter was not published until the secret files of the German foreign office were captured after the Second World War. William I had written in the margin – *'How long would these sympathies last?' and **'What ruler in Spain would be in a position to guarantee such a policy?'

SOURCE F

When the King heard that the candidature was being further discussed he said it was 'very extraordinary that this sort of thing was going on without his authorisation'. He wanted to be informed 'of everything that Spanish government agents bring before any action is taken'.

A report to Bismarck from an official in the Prussian Foreign Office, June 1870. In the margin Bismarck wrote 'So His Majesty wants the affair treated with official royal interference! The whole affair is only possible if it remains the limited concern of the Hohenzollern princes, it must not be turned into a Prussian concern. The King must be able to say without lying: I know nothing about it.'

SOURCE G

We do not believe that respect for the rights of a neighbouring people means that we have to allow a foreign power, by putting one of its princes on the throne of Spain, to alter the present balance of power in Europe to our disadvantage and endanger the interest and honour of France. To prevent it we count on the wisdom of the German people and the friendship of the Spanish people. If things develop otherwise, strong with your support and that of the nation, we shall know how to do our duty without hesitation and without weakness.

Gramont speaking to the French Chamber, 6 July 1870. Gramont was the minister in the French government in charge of foreign policy.

SOURCE H



A painting entitled 'The Proclamation of the German Empire'. This is the third version of this painting and was painted in 1885 to celebrate Bismarck's seventieth birthday. The original version was painted in 1871 and showed the occasion as dull, with Bismarck in a less important position. In this version Bismarck is the figure in white.

Now answer **all** the following questions. You may use any of the sources to help you answer the questions, in addition to those sources which you are told to use. In answering the questions you should use your knowledge of the topic to help you interpret and evaluate the sources.

1 Study Sources A and B.

How far do these two sources agree? Explain your answer using details of the sources. [7]

2 Study Sources C and D.

Does Source C prove that Bismarck was telling the truth to the French Ambassador in Source D? Explain your answer using details of the sources and your knowledge. [8]

3 Study Sources E and F.

How far does Source E make Source F surprising? Explain your answer using details of the sources and your knowledge. [9]

4 Study Source G.

Why did Gramont make this speech in July 1870? Explain your answer using details of the source and your knowledge. [7]

5 Study Source H.

How useful is this source as evidence about the unification of Germany? Explain your answer using details of the source and your knowledge. [7]

6 Study all the sources.

How far do these sources provide convincing evidence that Bismarck planned the Franco-Prussian War? Use the sources to explain your answer. [12]

Option B: 20th Century topic

WERE THE ALLIES DIVIDED OVER THE VERSAILLES PEACE SETTLEMENT?

Study the Background Information and the sources carefully, and then answer all the questions.

Background Information

On 18 January 1919 the Paris Peace Conference began. The three most important men in the Paris negotiations were Georges Clemenceau, Prime Minister of France, Lloyd George, Prime Minister of Britain, and Woodrow Wilson, President of the USA. Although these three countries had together fought Germany during the war, they did not necessarily agree about what form the peace settlement should take. Did they largely agree about what needed to be done, or were there fundamental differences and disagreements?

SOURCE A

Many details have been given of the personal relationships between Woodrow Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George. They were a greatly contrasted trio, but perhaps the most important thing they had in common was that all were leaders of democratic countries and therefore sensitive to national feelings at home. But whereas Lloyd George had just won a resounding victory in the 1918 election and Clemenceau had been granted an overwhelming vote of confidence by the French Parliament, Wilson's political power at home had just suffered a sharp decline. In Paris the French newspapers made fun of him and undermined his position. He became increasingly a lonely figure, holding on to the Covenant of the League of Nations to hide his political weaknesses and failures, prepared to sacrifice other principles to get it accepted by the British and the French.

Much has been written about how far the settlement was a compromise between the two opposing attitudes of Wilson and Clemenceau. Wilson, it is alleged, was the idealist, his eyes fixed on absolute justice. Clemenceau was the old-fashioned realist, the narrow nationalist filled with hatred of Germany. This vivid picture has just enough truth to be believable, but it is an interpretation not supported by the facts. If Wilson left Europe a bitter and disillusioned man because of the conditions of post-war Europe, it was not due to Clemenceau or Lloyd George. The international situation that faced the peacemakers in Paris was the problem.

From a history book published in 1957.

SOURCE B

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SOURCE C

Mr President. You have sent to France your young soldiers. Eager though they were to meet the enemy, they were unaware when they arrived of the monstrous crimes of the Germans. To obtain a proper view of the German conduct of the war, they had to witness the burnt-down cities, the flooded mines and the crumbling factories. You will have the opportunity, Mr President, to inspect with your own eyes the extent of the disaster.

The French government will also show you documents in which the German General Staff described its plan of plunder and industrial destruction.


From the speech of welcome by President Poincaré of France to President Wilson when he arrived in France in December 1918.

SOURCE D

One principle runs through the whole programme. It is the principle of justice to all people and all nationalities, whether they be strong or weak. Without this principle there can be no international justice.

President Wilson speaking in 1918 about his aims in the peace negotiations.

SOURCE E



REAR VIEW.

An American cartoon published in August 1919. The person conducting is President Wilson.

SOURCE F



SOURCE G

We have started a series of private conversations between Clemenceau, Wilson and myself for the discussion and determination of these very baffling problems. Unless we reach agreement, peace will be definitely postponed. What is worse still for all practical purposes, the alliance will cease to exist. I am hopeful of reaching complete agreement and we are getting nearer.

From a letter by Lloyd George in March 1919. Up until then the negotiations had been conducted in a Council of Ten and had proceeded very slowly.

SOURCE H



A German cartoon about the peace negotiations, published in 1919. It shows the devil surrounded by figures labelled 'revenge', 'greed' and 'lust for power'.

Now answer **all** the following questions. You may use any of the sources to help you answer the questions, in addition to those sources which you are told to use. In answering the questions you should use your knowledge of the topic to help you interpret and evaluate the sources.

1 Study Sources A and B.

How far do these two sources agree? Explain your answer using details of the sources. [6]

2 Study Sources C and D.

How would Wilson (Source D) have reacted to Source C? Explain your answer using details of the sources and your knowledge. [8]

3 Study Sources E and F.

How similar are the messages of these two cartoons? Explain your answer using details of the sources and your knowledge. [8]

4 Study Source G.

Are you surprised by this source? Explain your answer using details of the source and your knowledge. [8]

5 Study Source H.

Why was this cartoon published in 1919? Explain your answer using details of the source and your knowledge. [8]

6 Study all the sources.

How far do these sources provide convincing evidence that there were fundamental differences between the Allies during the peace negotiations? Use the sources to explain your answer. [12]

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Option A Source C	© Andrina Stiles & Alan Farmer; The Unification of Germany 1815-90; Hodder & Stoughton; 2001.
Option A Sources D, E, F & G	© W.G. Shreeves; Nationmaking in Nineteenth Century Europe; Nelson; 1984.
Option A Source H	© William Simpson; The Second Reich; Cambridge University Press; 1995.
Option B Source A	© David Thomson; Europe Since Napoleon; Longmans; 1957.
Option B Source B	© Piers Brendon; The Dark Valley; Jonathan Cape; 2000.
Option B Source D	© Tony McAleavy; Modern World History; Cambridge University Press; 1996.
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